EU citizenship, free movement and emancipation: a rejoinder by de Witte, Floris
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2016/69 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory 
Freedom of movement under attack: Is it worth 
defending as the core of EU citizenship? 
 
Edited by Floris de Witte, Rainer Bauböck and Jo Shaw  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship 
 
 
 
Freedom of movement under attack: 
Is it worth defending as the core of EU citizenship? 
 
  
 Edited by Floris de Witte, Rainer Bauböck and Jo Shaw  
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2016/69 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Edited by Floris de Witte, Rainer Bauböck and Jo Shaw, 2016 
Printed in Italy, December 2016 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major 
issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st 
century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing 
agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in 
Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, and e-books. Most of these are 
also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinions expressed by the author(s).  
 
 
 
EUDO CITIZENSHIP  
EUDO CITIZENSHIP is part of the European Union Democracy Observatory and publishes two kinds 
of working papers: (1) peer reviewed and previously unpublished manuscripts on topics of citizenship 
laws and policies covered by the observatory and (2) collections of edited contributions to EUDO 
CITIZENSHIP Forum Debates. For more information, visit our website at http://eudo-citizenship.eu 
 
Series editors:  
Rainer Bauböck (European University Institute, Political and Social Sciences) 
Iseult Honohan (University College Dublin, School of Politics and International Relations) 
Jo Shaw (University of Edinburgh, Law School) 
Maarten Vink (University of Maastricht, Department of Political Science) 
 
The views expressed in this publication cannot in any circumstance be regarded as the official position 
of the European Union. 
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
Abstract 
This forum debate discusses the link between Union citizenship and free movement. These concepts 
were long understood as progressive and fundamental mechanisms in drawing the citizen closer to the 
European integration project. Both concepts now appear in crisis. This is, of course, reflected in the 
run-up to, and outcome of the Brexit vote. But criticism on the link between Union citizenship and 
free movement must be understood in a wider context. It is the context within which welfare systems 
are perceived to struggle with the incorporation of migrant citizens; and within which the benefits 
linked to free movement are perceived to fall to specific groups or classes of citizens in society. This 
EUDO forum debate takes on this discussion in two different ways. One the one hand, it discusses 
whether free movement contributes to, or detracts from, the capacity of the EU to create a more just or 
legitimate relationship between its citizens. On the other hand, it discusses whether Union citizenship 
– a status that is fundamental to all nationals of the Member States, whether they move across borders 
or not – should be centred on free movement, or whether we need to rethink the premise of what it 
means to be a European citizen. 
Kickoff contribution and rejoinder by Floris de Witte, Daniel Thym, Richard Bellamy, Päivi Johanna 
Neuvonen, Vesco Paskalev, Saara Koikkalainen, Rainer Bauböck, Sarah Fine, Martijn van den Brink, 
Julija Sardelić, Kieran Oberman, Glyn Morgan, Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, and Martin Ruhs. 
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EU Citizenship, Free Movement and Emancipation: a rejoinder 
Floris de Witte* 
As was to be expected on a topic such as the relationship between free movement and Union 
citizenship, the discussion above has been both fruitful and wide-ranging, not in the least due to the 
decision of the British electorate to leave the EU that took place half-way through this EUDO forum 
debate (and that throws in doubt the rights of residence of Union citizens in the UK, as well as that of 
UK citizens in the EU). Rather than replying to the many interesting and insightful contributions 
individually, I will aim to address some of the themes that transcend the various points of view 
expressed. These are, in my view, three.  
First, many commentators have suggested that my defense of Union citizenship as being primarily 
about free movement is insufficiently sensitive to its exclusionary potential. This exclusion may take 
place at Europe’s borders (think of the refugee crisis), but also within the Member States, where free 
movement has been understood as being available primarily – and actually – for the young, urban, 
educated elite. For those left behind – be it at Europe’s borders or at home – free movement, on this 
account, is not a promise but a problem at the core of Union citizenship. The second theme that can be 
traced in the discussion is the effect that my understanding of free movement has on the state and its 
structures. On this view, construing Union citizenship as being centered on its capacity to discipline 
the nation state and its political processes through free movement creates a number of problems of its 
own – ranging from the reconstruction of political participation to the destabilization of internal 
processes of solidarity and will-formation. The third and final theme that many commentators have 
picked up on, in different ways, is that understanding Union citizenship as being primarily about free 
movement offers (at best) a partial, inaccurate and normatively unattractive vision of what the 
individual European subject is. Union citizenship, on this account, ought to be about more than 
allowing individuals to escape their nation state and its political or normative preferences. 
The exclusionary potential of free movement and Union citizenship 
In my initial contribution, I have defended the close link between free movement and Union 
citizenship on account that it liberates the individual from the shackles of majoritarian views ‘at 
home’, that it recalibrates ideas of justice in a more appropriate fashion, and that it is not premised on 
a vision of community that is exclusionary. Several commentators have emphasized that this vision is, 
however, also one that is selective. Sarah Fine highlights that while free movement might be a right 
that is available for EU citizens, it is also a reason for the creation of ‘hard’ external borders that 
attempt to keep out non-Europeans, who often find themselves stranded in terrible circumstances 
outside (or even inside) the EU. Kieran Oberman, likewise, points out that such closure on the EU-
level simply recreates the problem that I am trying to overcome: it excludes outsiders, limits their 
emancipation and capacity to enjoy a range of rights.  
Others, such as Rainer Bauböck, have emphasized that free movement (and therefore Union 
citizenship) prioritises the needs and aspirations of certain Europeans (let’s say the well-educated, 
young, urban, and middle-classes) over those of other Europeans (in the traditional account, this group 
comprises of the elderly, the rural, working classes). This division, as is well documented, also 
appeared to lie at the core of the electoral split in the UK on Brexit. Julija Sardelić adds to this account 
that mobility requires certain social and cultural resources that are unavailable for whole swathes of 
the population. The differentiation that is implicit in free movement, on these accounts, jars with the 
basic premise of equality that is central to our understanding of citizenship.  
                                                     
*
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Let me take these arguments in turn, starting with the exclusionary potential of free movement and 
Union citizenship in the most dramatic – territorial – sense. Sarah Fine is certainly correct to highlight 
that the process of integration and its manifestation as Fortress Europe has dramatic consequences for 
those that cannot claim a right to free movement or Union citizenship. And certainly the institutions of 
the EU have placed a dodgy understanding of vulnerability at the core of its external border policy: 
one that understands the EU and its Member States to be vulnerable from intrusion by ‘the other’ as an 
object, rather than one that understands the refugees as the subject of vulnerability. This process can, 
possibly, indeed by reduced to the creation of a category of Union citizen that remains the main 
subject of the EU legal order, and main preoccupation of its institutional order, as Martin Ruhs claims. 
But the argument that reduces the drama unfolding at the Union’s borders (and within the Union’s 
borders) to a problem that is created by free movement and Union citizenship conflates two – 
admittedly intertwined – processes.  
Borders matter. Borders construct polities and engender certain relationships. And those 
relationships matter for the way in which we attribute rights and obligations. Many of us would not 
feel particularly inclined to share our resources with, say, a Russian oligarch. Most of us, conversely, 
would give up just about anything for the sake of our children or partner. Between these two extreme 
poles, our commitment to others depends on a range of factors – from the agapistic reflex that extreme 
suffering generates, to ideas of historical, ethnic, linguistic communities and from those revolving 
around sexual orientation, gender or political preferences to those created by shared institutional 
frameworks. On this relational account, the creation of the EU is, in its simplest form, the 
institutionalization of new relationships between citizens across borders. Something links the Polish 
national to the Belgian national that does not include their Ukrainian (or Australian, Ecuadorian, 
Senegalese) neighbour. The relationships generated by Union citizenship, in other words, must mean 
something – in my account primarily a shared commitment towards opening up national communities. 
That does not, of course, mean that non-EU citizens ought to be treated poorly, that they are somehow 
undeserving of protection, admission to the territory of the EU or help. What it does mean is that these 
are two conceptually separate discussions. The extent to which we defend or limit free movement of 
Union citizens, and the matter in which we construe internally the rights and obligations of those EU 
citizens based on their inter-personal relationship as institutionalized by EU citizenship, has little to 
do with how we treat those outside our borders of membership. Conditions, obligations, and rights of 
membership are bounded: they include members, and exclude non-members. This applies to book 
clubs, terrorist organisations, and transnational political communities. What we owe refugees fleeing 
war in atrocious and hazardous circumstances is a question that is distinct from the question what we 
owe fellow European citizens. The difference – which also explains why the former is so difficult to 
answer legitimately and authoritatively – is that one of these questions has been institutionalized, and 
the other has not: we have legal norms and institutional structures that translate the ill-defined bond 
between Europeans into Union citizenship. And that institutionalization, in turn, is only possible once 
we accept that borders matter. Not as instruments to keep people out, but as instruments to solidify the 
relationships between those inside the borders. This also means that, contrary to Glyn Morgan’s 
suggestion, if the UK were to leave the EU its citizens cannot remain Union citizens, and cannot 
derive rights and obligations under that heading.  
But the close link between free movement and Union citizenship has a second exclusionary effect – 
one that is internal to the EU. On this view, Union citizenship is an advantage for those willing and 
able to make use of it; but a disadvantage for those who cannot. On this narrative, the ‘immobile’ 
citizen faces increased competition for jobs and welfare resources from the ‘mobile’ citizen. 
Citizenship and free movement, then, create winners and losers – a process that became blatantly 
obvious in the Brexit-vote. I would contest this argument both normatively and institutionally. The 
fact that only a portion of citizens actually make use of their right to free movement does not make the 
right any less important or relevant. A small proportion of the population makes use of their rights to 
free association or freedom of expression. Increasingly fewer people use their right to vote. Does that 
make these rights increasingly less relevant or important? Of course not. The same applies to free 
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movement. The mere possibility of movement, legally guaranteed by free movement and Union 
citizenship, moreover, also has a reflexive virtue, as picked up by Vesco Paskalev (who highlights that 
younger Brits – regardless of their exercise of free movement – understand it to be a public good) and 
Saara Koikkalainen (who shows that 78% of EU-wide respondents support free movement). The 
possibility of free movement liberates the self-understanding of the individual from the collective self-
understanding of the polity they happen to be born in.  
This does not mean that Union citizenship and free movement offer an equal opportunity of 
exercise to all Union citizens. As I will discuss below, the EU does not dispose of the institutional 
framework that can articulate and sustain such an understanding of substantive justice. To be sure, free 
movement presupposes certain social and cultural resources (if not necessarily those associated with 
the ‘transnational elite’ – it is hardly against these groups that the Brexit-vitriol was directed). What 
matters for our argument in this section, however, is not that free movement has high conditions of 
entry, but that it creates negative effects for those that do not make use of it (for whatever reason). 
This can be explained in one of two ways. First, and in the most important narrative in the Brexit 
campaign, it was suggested the EU migrants not only take jobs away from UK citizens, but also 
welfare resources, and create increased pressure on schools and hospitals. At the same time, every 
single piece of research that has taken place suggests that the UK benefits fiscally from free 
movement. How can these two positions be squared? It’s very simple: by the decision of successive 
UK governments not to invest the fiscal windfall from free movement in additional welfare resources 
such as schools and hospitals.  
The other way of explaining the cleavage between pro-mobile and anti-mobile citizens is not to 
focus on the economics, but on identity politics. Rainer Bauböck, for example, refers to Theresa 
Kuhn’s book in highlighting that individual experiences of transnationalism (‘lived experience’) 
makes them more pro-European and pro-free movement. On this view, it is to be expected that, say, 
Gibraltar, would vote in favour of staying in the EU with 96%, while, say, Stoke-on-Trent would vote 
with 69.4% against it. But that argument understands the idea of ‘transnational experiences’ much too 
narrowly. The ‘Leave’ voters in Stoke eat pizza and drink Stella Artois. The local pride – Stoke City 
football club – combines English players with Dutch, Austrian, Spanish, Italian and Irish stars. These 
kind of less obvious transnational experiences matter as they locate elements of ‘the other’ in 
something we consider our ‘own’. The social capital built up through free movement extends much 
beyond instances of Erasmus or holidays abroad. It pervades our world.  
But if both the economic and the sociological argument explaining the cleavage between pro-
mobile and anti-mobile are at best oversold, how can we explain its indisputable emergence? The 
starting point in this analysis was intimated above – and that is that many of the citizens that have 
rejected the EU have indeed been ‘left behind’. But the main culprit is their own government, not the 
EU. This is different, of course, in instances where the EU mandates welfare reform through its 
austerity drive. But blaming welfare scarcity in the UK on the EU seems a bit rich. Yet why do voters 
blame the EU and not the UK? This is where Brexit reveals a more structural problem for the EU, as I 
have discussed elsewhere. It is because the EU cannot institutionalize contestation appropriately. In a 
well-functioning democracy, discontent that is so widely spread as the Brexit-cleavage is internalized 
in the system, and mediated through the politics of contestation. In such a system, political conflict 
feeds into the process of decision-making and stabilizes the overall project. Democracy, on this view, 
is a safety valve for emergent discontent. In the EU, on the other hand, the nature, conditions, and 
consequences of free movement cannot be contested. The only possible way to contest the normative 
orientation of the European market is to leave the EU. And so we see ‘hard left’ parties claiming that if 
we want to resist the neo-liberal nature of the EU, the only thing we can do is leave it. And so we have 
parties on the extreme right claiming that if we want to resist immigration (for whatever reason), the 
only thing that we can do is leave the EU. If the EU doesn’t start to think about how it can internalize 
and institutionalize contestation of its values, Union citizenship and free movement will indeed be 
seen as something that divides, that creates winners and losers. Not necessarily because it does create 
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winners and losers, but because its contours and effects are not mediated through a process that can 
legitimize and explain the outcome. 
What Union citizenship and free movement do to the state 
A second theme that has emerged in the discussion is that my account of Union citizenship as 
‘anchorless’ and as getting round the ‘ethno-centric’ vision of the nation state, on the one hand, 
underestimates the virtues of national institutional structures in solidifying inter-personal 
commitments and general will-formation and, on the other hand, underestimates the power of free 
movement as an instrument for cosmopolitan justice. These two points – made by Richard Bellamy 
and Kieran Oberman, respectively – suggest that my argument takes seriously neither the nation state 
nor cosmopolitanism. Instead, it is precariously perched between these two poles: free movement and 
non-discriminatory access to welfare benefits for EU migrants, on this account, are parasitical on 
domestic political commitments and extend them across borders without succeeding in fully 
disentangling them from the nation state and its structures. In simple terms, it destabilizes the nation 
state without replacing it with the promise of egalitarian cosmopolitanism. More is lost than gained in 
the exercise.  
Richard Bellamy highlights that my argument is premised on the quest to create “a fully fledged 
political and legal cosmopolitanism that looks to the ultimate demise of nation states as a necessary 
condition for justice”. He suggests that in doing so I misrepresent the state. The modern-day nation 
state is less exclusionary and more pluralist than I have presented it to be; and it is, crucially, 
indispensible for the determination, enforcement and stability of sharing practices. On the first point 
Bellamy is partially right: it is empirically demonstrable that membership to national political 
communities has never been more inclusive and pluralist. But this has clearly not affected the capacity 
for exclusionary and ethno-centric political narratives to control the political process – across the EU 
(and the US). It seems that the more diverse and inclusive our societies have become in terms of their 
membership, the less sensitive their politics become to diversity and inclusion of those that are not 
members. More inclusive membership thus does not equate to a pluralist society. On the second point 
Bellamy is completely right: the nation state remains absolutely indispensible in the determination, 
enforcement and stability of sharing practices and the processes of collective will-formation. My 
argument is not based on the rejection of the state – and on the slow process towards a political 
cosmopolitanism. Instead, it is based on the realization that, given that the state and its institutional 
structures are indispensible for structuring authority in a legitimate fashion, we must be sensitive to 
its externalities. On this view, EU citizenship and free movement are not meant to obliterate the state; 
they are meant to limit the externalities of the institutional structure of the nation state. The first 
externality has been discussed at length in my initial post: that the nation state limits choices available 
for the citizen. The trade-off in liberal democracies is that in return for your chance to vote, you accept 
the majority position. Free movement cuts across this limit and offers Union citizens the choice of 
different visions of ‘the good’.  
The second and more structural externality, which Bellamy has picked up, is most easily explained 
if we pick up an element discussed above – that demands of justice are relational. As Païvi Johanna 
Neuvonen also reminds us, relationships between individuals that generate claims of justice or 
solidarity might take place within borders, but also across borders. The point that my initial 
contribution makes is essentially that while we have institutions that can make sense of the former 
type of relationships (namely, the domestic political process, that can mediate between competing 
claims of justice by insiders), it cannot possibly make sense of the relationships across borders. 
Imagine an Irish woman living in France and working in Belgium. What does the social relationship 
between her and French society mean in terms of justice? What does Belgium ‘owe’ her because of 
her economic participation in the Belgian market? Allowing the French or Belgian political system to 
answer these questions creates a democratic problem, as our Irish women (and therefore her relational 
position vis-à-vis nationals) are not included in its determination. This is where and how free 
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movement and Union citizenship, and particularly through the principle of non-discrimination based 
on nationality serve to more appropriately settle questions of justice and democracy. Union citizenship 
and free movement respect the institutional structures of the nation state in the determination and 
enforcement of questions of justice. As far as EU law is concerned, the Austrian decision to have free 
tertiary education is as ‘just’ as the UK’s decision to charge £9000 per year. This respect for national 
choices is indeed, as Bellamy highlights, necessary for its stability. What free movement law does is 
simply extend that decision to include those Union citizens who have a sufficiently strong relationship 
with the host state – be it through economic or social interactions. As such, free movement and Union 
citizenship do not serve to substitute for the nation state and its structures, they serve, instead, to 
recalibrate questions of justice in a fashion that is more sensitive to the relationships across border that 
the EU has engendered, to which the nation state is structurally blind.  
This idea of Union citizenship as supplementing national citizenship can, of course, be deduced 
from the text of the Treaty. It also means that Union citizenship and free movement are not 
codifications of a sort of cosmopolitanism as suggested by Kieran Oberman. Free movement, on my 
account, is not a good per se. It is a good because of the way in which it recalibrates domestic 
processes of will-formation and sharing – not because it seeks to replace or subvert them. It creates 
emancipatory potential for individuals exactly because they can navigate between existing institutional 
articulations of justice and ‘the good life’. Without those institutional structures of the nation state, 
free movement and equal treatment is pointless. Being equally entitled to nothing, after all, entitles 
you to nothing. This leads to me to the final point that I made in my initial contribution. The way in 
which Union citizenship and free movement attempt to internalize relationships across borders within 
domestic institutional structures is normatively appealing exactly because it piggy-backs on those 
domestic structures. There is no need for the articulation of a European form of ‘being’ that can 
integrate and structure its own idea of community and political form. EU citizenship is, in a sense, 
agnostic.  
A normative vision for Union citizenship 
The final theme that has come through the discussion is that this link between free movement and 
citizenship that is central in my account makes for a normatively and institutionally impoverished 
vision of justice. This critique comes in many flavours. Daniel Thym highlights that the Court’s ruling 
in Dano, for example, demonstrates the absence of a robust or ‘thick’ principle of justice in the 
Court’s understanding of what free movement and Union citizenship mean. More broadly, he argues 
that even if free movement once constituted the core of a normatively ambitious idea of what it means 
to be a European citizen; the Union has now lost constitutional confidence, and has become more 
deferential to domestic ideas of belonging, sharing and justice. What is needed, then, is a thicker 
vision of social justice that engages all Europeans, whether they move or not. Criticism of this lack of 
a more coherent and nuanced idea of justice can also be traced in other contributions. Johanna Païvi 
Neuvonen suggests that the normative centrality of free movement understands the subject as 
atomistic and unencumbered – which makes for a narrow, individualistic, and, ultimately, not 
particularly emancipated, self. Emancipation, after all, requires the capacity to encounter the ‘other’ as 
part of the construction of the self. Vesco Paskalev argues that the ease of movement across borders 
destabilizes another element that is crucial to justice and citizenship: that of (equal) political 
participation and engagement. On these accounts, free movement does not suffice. Union citizenship 
should be about more than simply free movement if it is to be normatively appealing. I broadly agree 
on these points, in so far as they indicate that Union citizenship offers a partial vision of justice at best. 
It does not set out a vision of substantive justice for 500 million Europeans. It does not deal well with 
instances of discrimination that transcend borders, as Julija Sardelić reminds us. 
The problem is that Union citizenship can never offer more than a partial vision of justice unless 
we recreate on the European level the institutional preconditions that we find on the national level (and 
that I have argued in favour of above). To use the example mentioned above: is it more ‘just’ to fund 
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tertiary education through general taxation or make the student pay himself? If we have a fiscal 
windfall of €400 million, should we spend it on healthcare, pensions, or education? These questions 
can only legitimately be answered if they are discussed and mediated through a ‘thick’ democratic 
institutional structure – of which the EU is a very very distant cousin. The EU simply does not possess 
the institutional structure required to answer the question: ‘what is it to be European?’ or ‘what do we 
Europeans owe each other’. And this institutional incapacity leaves us in a double bind: national 
political processes are sufficiently ‘thick’, but structurally exclude relationships across borders from 
consideration. European political processes are too thin to articulate a substantive vision of justice for 
all 500 million Europeans. What we are left with is the legal norms of free movement and EU 
citizenship that seek (and not always succeed) to figure out what these relationships across borders 
mean in terms of justice. The idea of justice in the EU, in a sense, is tiered: it depends on both national 
institutional structures and transnational legal norms. Free movement and Union citizenship, then, as 
Païvi Johanna Neuvonen forcefully argues in her comment and her recent book, may not be sufficient 
to achieve justice in the EU – but they are necessary. Unless and until the EU develops its institutional 
structure in a way that is more sensitive to the views of its citizens, this is as good as it gets.  
The institutional implication of this argument is that the scope and limits of free movement and 
Union citizenship cannot be decided through political structures as they currently are. Martijn van den 
Brink has argued that the Union legislator offers a democratic – if not particularly ambitious – vision 
on what free movement means, and the Court in Dano was right in accepting this vision. Union 
citizenship, in his view, is not a normative commitment towards emancipation and the limitation of 
state power, but its opposite: an expression of state power. Member States, acting together in the 
Council, have the right to decide when and under which conditions free movement is possible, and to 
decide what the limits of EU citizenship ought to be. This argument underestimates the level of 
institutional sophistication that is required for a system to be able to ‘translate’ inter-personal 
relational claims of justice and solidarity into a legitimate and enforceable system of rights and 
obligations. As Richard Bellamy has highlighted as well, the institutional presuppositions for this task 
cannot be found beyond the nation state. The EU lacks thick representative, deliberative and 
participatory elements, it lacks the support cast of integrated political parties, civil society, grassroots 
movements, transnational media that allow for inter-personal communication about the question: ‘how 
do we want to live together in this social space?’ ‘What do we owe each other by virtue of our shared 
participation in the EU?’. The Union legislator cannot possibly get the answer to these questions 
‘right’. So we are left in an institutional situation where these incipient, partial, and ill-defined bonds 
and relationships between Europeans, created by transnational economic, social, political and cultural 
links cannot be articulated by either national legislatures or their European counterparts. Ill-equipped 
as the Court may be to makes sense of these new relationships, it is the only institution that can make 
good on its premise: that it must mean ‘something’ to be a Union citizen beyond what it means to be a 
national of a Member State.  
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